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R ecommender Systems and Autonomy:
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Abstract

Recommender systems are now widely deployed
across multiple dimensions of the digital reality that increasingly
shapes our lives. In doing so, they mould individual thoughts and
actions and can affect individual and collective autonomy. In
this paper we first discuss how the ubiquitous exercise of ‘soft’
power by recommender systems on individual users presents
interference into individual autonomy and its legal dimensions,
expressed through collective and individual self-determination,
democratic values and institutions, as well as individual human
rights and freedoms. We then argue that this exercise of power
over individual and collective destinies necessitates regulatory
action to establish an appropriate system of checks and
balances on recommender systems and their creators. Utilising
a bottom-up approach, we look at the fundamental aspects of
a recommender system’s design and functioning that shape the
impact these algorithms have on individual autonomy. On the
basis of this, we identify three key areas where regulation can be
targeted in order to empower users and address current power
imbalances - (1) algorithmic design, (2) data protection rights,
and (3) transparency and oversight. We map the key questions
and options for future regulatory action in each of these domains,
highlighting the decisions and competing interests that regulators
will need to consider. We conclude by discussing the policy
implications of this mapping of the debate and the relevance they
have for the future of recommender systems regulation.
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I. I ntroduction
As the amount of information uploaded to the Internet has continued to
grow, exploring content without any sort of structure or guidance has
become overwhelming, possibly even impossible. Every second 6 new websites are published, 1,099 posts are shared on Instagram, 4,050 photos are
uploaded to Facebook and 5,787 tweets are posted on Twitter. These numbers increase every second.1 Mirroring this explosion, recommender systems
(‘RS’) have quickly become ubiquitous and are currently used to personalise
content choices and rankings across platforms and apps. RS are algorithms
that curate — what they identify as — relevant information by tailoring
it to individual users through data processing techniques. RS are used to
recommend friends or content on social media, but they can just as easily
1

Spectralplex, ‘How Much Content is Uploaded to the Internet Per Second?’ (Spectralplex)
<https://spectralplex.com/how-much-content-is-uploaded-to-the-internet-per-second/>
accessed 25 March 2021.
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be used to suggest tailored diets or exercises in weight loss apps or present
options for travel routes on the basis of traffic density information. Behind
the scenes, RS are also used in targeted and behavioural advertising — the
engine of dominant Internet business models. The profiling and user tracking needed for personalisation have been criticised due to the privacy intrusions that they give rise to. In this article, however, we argue that the impact
of RS goes far beyond such privacy concerns. Instead, the suggestive power
of ‘recommendations’ based on individual thoughts and actions can impact
individual autonomy and, by extension, human rights as well as individual
and collective self-determination.
Through their functioning, RS increasingly shape our experience in a virtual environment2 and thanks to machine learning (‘ML’) and the increasing collection of personal data, these algorithms can now enable granular
and persuasive micro targeting. This brings about tangible shifts in our
thoughts and actions or, stated otherwise, autonomy. Individuals’ choices
could be affected by RS determining the content or options visible to them.3
Individuals can also be influenced by the order in which information is presented;4 we prioritise those items that are ranked higher on a list.5 By doing
this in the absence of conscious awareness and individual choice regarding how content is targeted at them, recommendations may disrupt an individual’s capacity of self-determination. A recent, notorious example of the
impact RS can have on individual autonomy, thoughts and actions, is that of
Molly Russel. Molly was a fourteen-year-old schoolgirl who took her own
life in November 2017, days before her fifteenth birthday. After her death,
Ian Russel, her father, publicly blamed Big Tech, in particular Instagram,

2

3

4

5

Silvia Milano, Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano Floridi, ‘Recommender Systems and their
Ethical Challenges’ (2020) 35 AI & Society 957.
Christine Clavien, ‘Ethics of Nudges: A General Framework with a Focus on Shared
Preference Justifications’ (2018) 47 Journal of Moral Education 366.
Andreas Hellmann, Chiing Yeow and Lurion De Mello, ‘The Influence of Textual
Presentation Order and Graphical Presentation on the Judgements of Non-Professional
Investors’ (2017) 47 Accounting and Business Research 455; Buck KW Pei, Philip MJ
Reckers and Robert W Wyndelts, ‘The Influence of Information Presentation Order on
Professional Tax Judgment’ (1990) 11 Journal of Economic Psychology 119; Michael
Eisenberg and Carol Barry, ‘Order Effects: A Study of the Possible Influence of Presentation
Order on User Judgments of Document Relevance’ (1988) Journal of the American Society
for Information Science 8.
Mark T Keane, Maeve O’Brien and Barry Smyth, ‘Are People Biased in Their Use of Search
Engines?’ (2008) 51 Communications of the ACM 49; Jonah Berger, ‘Does Presentation
Order Impact Choice After Delay?’ (2016) 8 Topics in Cognitive Science 670.
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for his daughter’s death.6 After Molly’s death, Mr. Russel found out that his
daughter’s Instagram newsfeed was full of suicidal posts. In his own words:7
I think Molly probably found herself becoming depressed. She was
always very self-sufficient and liked to find her own answers. I think
she looked towards the internet to give her support and help. She may
well have received support and help, but what she also found was a
dark, bleak world of content that accelerated her towards more such
content.

Mr. Russel alleged that Instagram’s algorithms, by targeting content at
Molly, ended up pushing her into that “dark rabbit hole of depressive suicidal content.”8 This case illustrates a broader phenomenon of social media
influences and content curation that affect individual’s physical and mental
health,9 and not just of children. Depending on their field of application,
RS could also affect the rights of users, e.g., if used in news media or in
healthcare. RS that prioritises some news or publications at the expense of
others could be softly limiting the right of readers to access information or of
writers to express their opinions and impart information. RS in health apps,
by providing suggestions for exercise or diet, could directly play a role in the
health of their users, thus affecting their right to health. The causal relationship between RS and particular outcomes for their users is soft but extant.
Yet, assessing the power and influence RS have in a triangular relationship is
trickier, e.g., situations where a RS shapes the information served to a user
and it is the actions of that user that then go on to produce rights-impacting
effects. For example, a RS used by a doctor could suggest a particular treatment for a patient, but it is the actions of the doctor that would ultimately
determine what treatment is provided. Or, more controversially, a RS could
present content against a particular protected demographic group (e.g.,
religious, racial, etc.) to people already demonstrating bigoted beliefs, and
can, thus, encourage a view of the world that could potentially push them
towards committing violence against members of those racial or religious
6

7

8
9

Jacob Dirnhuber, ‘Heartbroken Dad Claims Instagram ‘helped to Kill His 14-Year-Old
Daughter’ Who took her Own Life after Viewing Suicide Posts’ The Sun (22 January 2019)
<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/8258105/ian-russell-molly-instagram-killed-daughter/>
accessed 31 March 2021.
Press Association, ‘Molly Russell Entered “Dark Rabbit Hole of Suicidal Content” Online,
Says Father’ Evening Express (17 January 2020) <https://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/
news/molly-russell-entered-dark-rabbit-hole-of-suicidal-content-online-says-father-2/>
accessed 31 March 2021.
ibid.
Faith Ridler, ‘Now 30 Families Blame Social Media Firms for Their Roles in Children’s
Suicides’ Mail Online (27 January 2019) <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6636807/Now-30-families-blame-social-media-firms-roles-childrens-suicides.html>
accessed 31 March 2021.

2021

RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS AND AUTONOMY

5

groups. Dissecting the causal role of RS in such triangular relationships is
complex and most likely does not meet the legal standard of causation in
most jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is clear that RS play a significant role in
shaping the perceptions, and thus scope for autonomy of their users.
The persuasive strength of the impact of RS on autonomy may range, at its
most innocent, from small nudges to premeditated and targeted manipulation of information and individuals.10 Nudging is the design of choice architecture that pushes individuals towards a predictable and desirable behaviour
without explicitly limiting freedom of choice.11 Instead, it does so by relying
on “cognitive boundaries, biases, routines, and habits.”12 Even if not directly
limiting choices, a choice architecture might interfere with the ability of a
person to identify and consider their options and, thus, affects their agency.13
The use of personal information can enhance the effectiveness of recommendations, increasing the ‘controlling’ power of influences on the individual, threatening autonomy.14 In the digital realm, creating architectures that
affect individual choices may be unavoidable; for example, there must be
a choice of layout and user interface.15 Some have highlighted that careful
considerations are needed when acting as a ‘digital choice architect,’ due to
the great impact such decisions have on user actions.16 In a digital setting,
people are more likely to act automatically or intuitively,17 with decreased
attention span and concentration,18 while being increasingly distracted and

10

11

12

13

14
15

16

17

18

Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Technology, Autonomy, and
Manipulation’ (2019) 8 Internet Policy Review <https://policyreview.info/node/1410>
accessed 5 March 2021.
Richard H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (Rev and expanded ed, Penguin Books 2009).
Pelle Guldborg Hansen, ‘The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: Does the
Hand Fit the Glove?’ (2016) 7 European Journal of Risk Regulation 155.
JS Blumenthal-Barby, ‘Choice Architecture: A Mechanism for Improving Decisions While
Preserving Liberty?’ in Christian Coons and Michael Weber (eds), Paternalism: Theory
and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013).
Susser, Roessler and Nissenbaum (n 10) 3.
Daniel M Hausman and Brynn Welch, ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge*’ (2010) 18
Journal of Political Philosophy 123, 124; Tobias Mirsch, Christiane Lehrer and Reinhard
Jung, ‘Digital Nudging: Altering User Behavior in Digital Environments’, Proceedings der
13. Internationalen Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik (WI 2017) (2017) <https://wi2017.
ch/images/wi2017-0370.pdf> accessed 5 March 2021; Cass R Sunstein and Richard H
Thaler, ‘“Preferences, Paternalism, and Liberty”’ (2006) 59 Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplement 233, 250.
Tim-Benjamin Lembcke and others, ‘To Nudge or Not to Nudge: Ethical Considerations of
Digital Nudging Based on Its Behavioral Economics Roots’ 18, 10.
Shlomo Benartzi and Jonah Lehrer, The Smarter Screen: Surprising Ways to Influence and
Improve Online Behavior (2015).
Ziming Liu, ‘Reading Behavior in the Digital Environment: Changes in Reading Behavior
over the Past Ten Years’ (2005) 61 Journal of Documentation 700.
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multitasking.19 Moreover, the digital environment offers a wealth of tools
and options at the disposal of creators and designers, along with the ability
to micro-target and personalise content which may increase the effectiveness
of nudges. 20 Even when users are aware of the role that algorithms play in
online settings, they remain confident about their own autonomy and do not
account for how they might be influenced.21 In fact, knowing that information, e.g. advertisement, is targeted specifically to us might even change the
way we view ourselves and the qualities that we associate with ourselves.22
All of this suggests that individuals may be more vulnerable to decision-making errors in the digital realm both due to traditionally studied biases, as well
as due to digital-specific and visual biases. 23
Despite their potential far-reaching impact, until now RS have operated
with little regulation to ensure checks and balances on their influence. Their
name – ‘recommender systems’ – leaves the impression that their impact
on human lives is soft and superficial. However, their influence could be
described as analogous to Nye’s concept of soft power in international relations – “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through
attraction rather than coercion or payment.”24 By shaping our attention, RS
attract us to one action or another. In some circumstances, the effects of this
attraction can be equated with a de facto force, as seen in the Molly Russel
case.
However, this lack of regulatory framework is changing. There have been
indications that regulating RS has been on the minds of policy-makers in
Europe. In November 2021, the European Commission proposed an AI
Regulation (‘the (draft) AI Act’)25 that seeks to establish common ex ante
market requirements and ex post control measures on AI systems to ensure
their safety and trustworthiness. The AI Act includes software that generates

19

20
21

22

23
24

25

Kep Kee Loh and Ryota Kanai, ‘How Has the Internet Reshaped Human Cognition?’
(2016) 22 The Neuroscientist 506.
Lembcke and others (n 16) 8.
Leyla Dogruel, Dominique Facciorusso and Birgit Stark, ‘“I’m Still the Master of the
Machine.” Internet Users’ Awareness of Algorithmic Decision-Making and Their Perception
of Its Effect on Their Autonomy’ (2020) Information, Communication & Society 1.
Christopher A Summers, Robert W Smith and Rebecca Walker Reczek, ‘An Audience of
One: Behaviorally Targeted Ads as Implied Social Labels’ (2016) 43 Journal of Consumer
Research 156.
Lembcke and others (n 16) 8.
Joseph S Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’ (2008) 616 The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 94, 94.
Commission, ‘‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Laying down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and
Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts’’ COM (2021) 206 final.
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influential recommendations in its definition of AI 26 and goes on to explicitly prohibit AI systems that use “subliminal techniques beyond a person’s
consciousness.”27 It also prohibits systems that exploit “vulnerabilities of a
specific group of persons due to their age, physical or mental disability”28 in
order to “materially distort a person’s behaviour” in a way that causes or
is likely to result in physical or psychological harm to that person or others. This prohibition seems to echo the dangers demonstrated by the Molly
Russell case. In December 2021, the EU Digital Services Act (‘DSA’) was
proposed. 29 The DSA also pays special attention to RS, particularly as used
by very large online platforms and in advertising, and provides for multiple
pathways to enhance their transparency to end users, external auditors, and
the general public.30 The DSA also recognises the systemic risk that could
arise from RS and imposes risk assessment and management obligations
on very large platforms. The risks of disseminating illegal content, negative
effects on the exercise of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and information, and the automated misuse and manipulation of their
services with the goal of affecting democratic processes and civic discourse
were specifically highlighted.31 Even though the DSA continues to develop,
the European Parliament rapporteur and the Council have expressed a desire
to further reinforce transparency and user control over RS, obligations on
large platforms, search engines, and online market places.32 In the same vein,
in January 2022, the Cybersecurity Administration of China also published
a set of regulations intended to regulate RS, pushing for greater user control,
limits on what data the systems can use, as well as more transparency of how
they function.33
What is clear from these recent legislative developments is that there
is a movement towards tackling the challenges that RS have given rise
26
27
28
29

30
31
32

33

AI Act, art 3(1).
AI Act, art 5(1)(a).
AI Act, art 5(1)(b).
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act)’ and amending Directive 2000/31/
EC, COM(2020) 825 final. (European Commission 2020) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A
2020%3A825%3AFIN>
accessed 30 March 2021.
Digital Services Act (DSA), arts 29, 30.
DSA, arts 26, 27.
‘Legislative Train Schedule - Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending
Directive 2000/31/EC / After 2020-09’ (European Parliament, 17 December 2021)
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train> accessed 15 January 2022.
Arendse Huld, ‘China Passes Sweeping Recommendation Algorithm Regulations’ (China
Briefing News, 6 January 2022) <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-passes-sweeping-recommendation-algorithm-regulations/> accessed 15 January 2022.

8

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

to - whether it is manipulation, behavioural change, fundamental rights
impacts, or whether it is a larger scale impact on democratic processes and
civic discourse, which affect collective self-determination. As these legislative processes evolve, we will observe how interests intertwined in this topic
are to be balanced against each other.
With this article we would like to contribute to this debate. We focus
on the perspective of individual users of RS, excluding from our analysis
triangular situations where RS support decisions made by users regarding
other individuals, and explore, from a European legal perspective, what role
regulation does and can play in empowering individual users and safeguarding individual autonomy. We direct our analysis to future regulatory directions along the axes of shaping user-centric RS design, enabling user control
through a data protection rights-based approach, and facilitating informed
decision-making and accountability through comprehensive transparency.
Even though the challenges posed by RS are gaining attention around the
world, this article is grounded in European legal developments and, therefore, future research would be needed to shed light on whether and how they
might be suited for other legal systems.
In the following Section II, we introduce autonomy and self-determination and how they are manifested, implicitly or explicitly, in law. We explain
how RS operate on a technical level and how this can affect key aspects of
autonomy, both legally, as well as philosophically conceptualised. Then, in
the rest of the article, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of safeguarding
autonomy in regulatory frameworks and then highlight key options, decisions and pathways forward. The key areas for regulation that we discuss are
algorithmic design, user data protection rights, and transparency and oversight of RS as they are either directly implicated in determining the way in
which individual autonomy is affected, as in the case of algorithmic design,
or they constitute valuable tools to empower users or their representatives to
safeguard individual autonomy, as in the case of data protection rights and
transparency.
Thus, in Section III.A, we discuss regulatory options for safeguarding and
promoting autonomy in the design of RS, using a law-by-design approach.
In Section III.B we focus on the privacy and data protection rights upon
which individuals could rely in order to control the information about them
used for profiling and recommendations. Finally, in Section III.C we discuss
transparency as a vital tool to ease the current asymmetrical distribution of
information and power between RS creators and users and as a key infrastructure to enable accountability and meaningful human oversight over the
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power exerted by RS. The goal of our approach is not to limit or prohibit
RS, as they may be a desirable feature of virtual environments. Instead, we
seek to highlight the gaps and needs that a regulatory framework should seek
to fill in order to foster the creation and use of RS in a manner that truly
ensures individual autonomy – that users are in the driver’s seat, that they are
aware of and can themselves shape or even exclude recommendations from
their virtual worlds as they see fit, and that, vitally, there is a clear legal recognition of the impact that RS have on individuals and society that demands
responsibility.

II. Autonomy

and recommender systems

Autonomy is a normative concept about the rightful claim to self-determination in multiple contexts, be they collective or individual, national or international, and is also the foundation of human rights, democracy and the rule
of law. The concept of autonomy in the law refers to the scope and ability
of individuals or groups to make decisions for themselves or to “follow their
own life plan”34 and this right is explicitly or implicitly protected at multiple
levels in the law. On a fundamental level, autonomy is demonstrated through
the capacity of individuals to freely bind themselves in contracts, a manifestation of their self-determination.35 On a higher level, autonomy is protected
and enabled through legal certainty and the rule of law. Compliance with the
rule of law makes governmental actions and the legal framework predictable
and empowers individuals to plan their lives around them. This relation is
enabled by transparency allowing individuals to judge the legality of their
actions or claims. Autonomy is also a cross-cutting and transversal principle
that is ingrained in every human right but comes to the fore in specific constellations, as demonstrated in human rights law practice. If a specific right is
protected, this necessarily includes the autonomy of humans to use that right
freely. The right to property includes the autonomy of a subject to dispose of
property in any way, including destroying it. The freedom of opinion grants
the right to make one’s opinion known or to stay silent. Other rights are more
clearly linked to individual autonomy, for example as art 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to respect for private and
family life. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interpreted this
provision to find a right to personal autonomy, identity and integrity within

34

35

Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology, and Autonomy (Hart Pub
2001) 2.
Thomas Gutmann, ‘Some Preliminary Remarks on a Liberal Theory of Contract’ (2013) 76
Law and Contemporary Problems 39.
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art 8.36 Human rights bills protecting human dignity also situate autonomy
in this context. The right to self-determination, as enshrined in arts 1 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
also shows that autonomy has a collective side. This side is expanded on
especially in the area of minority rights, where a degree of autonomy could
allow minority groups sufficient self-determination to benefit from the group
rights that majorities typically experience.37 The collective self-determination of peoples, communities, and nations is also linked to democratic institutions and processes. This points back to the literal historical meaning of
autonomy. It means that individuals or groups should provide for the rules
governing them. In contrast, the concept of heteronomy provides that the
rules are made by somebody else.38 Thus, individual and collective autonomy
permeates and acts as a foundation to multiple layers of the legal order.
This demonstrates that autonomy is a fundamental value and backbone of
many legal systems that is safeguarded through the rule of law, fundamental
rights, democratic processes and institutions, and even individual responsibility, liability, and the freedom to contract. As a cornerstone of many
legal structures, there is an acknowledgement that autonomy is valuable and
should be appropriately safeguarded. We will now explore whether and how
RS interact with autonomy before exploring what the current and future
legal landscape of regulating this relationship looks like in the next section.
In order to demonstrate how precisely RS and autonomy are interlinked, we take a conceptual approach towards understanding autonomy.
Autonomy, in its practical ethical dimension, can be seen to require two
essential conditions: independence from controlling influences (liberty) and
capacity to intentionally act and decide (agency).39 RS can affect both of
these dimensions of autonomy on an individual and collective level. Relevant
to RS, exerting control and influence or manipulation can affect the decision-making capacity of individuals,40 thus making them subject to the will

36

37

38

39

40

Jill Marshall, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Autonomy, Identity and
Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
2009) .
J Wright, ‘Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies 605.
Simon Hornblower, ‘Autonomy’ in Tim Whitmarsh (ed), Oxford Classical Dictionary
(Oxford University Press 2015)..
Lav R Varshney, ‘Respect for Human Autonomy in Recommender Systems’ [2020]
arXiv:2009.02603 [cs] <http://arxiv.org/abs/2009.02603> accessed 5 March 2021; Tom
L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, Oxford
University Press 2019).
Beauchamp and Childress (n 39).
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of another.41 This could affect individual liberty directly, by limiting the
scope for individual decision-making, or more perniciously, by distorting the
individual capacity to make informed decisions and, thus, their agency. For
example, RS have been linked to the creation of ‘filter bubbles’ that limit the
range and diversity of information users see42 and can lead to political polarisation and a partial view of the world. In an extreme form, filter bubbles
could reinforce messages of suicide,43 radicalization and extremisation,44 and
mistrust of vaccines,45 thus affecting both individuals and whole communities. Such actions can also lead to direct consequences on human rights.
The Molly Russel incident spoke to children’s rights, especially the physical
integrity of children. Healthcare treatment or diagnosis recommendations
can touch upon these and the right to health. When used in the context of
social media and content curation or moderation, RS can have an impact on
democracy, the freedom of speech and personality rights. This shows that
RS can affect a multiplicity of human rights and freedoms and shape the
space within which individuals can act with true autonomy just by directing
individual attention and shaping individual thoughts and actions. From an
individual level, through humans as an intermediary, RS could bring about
tangible effects on human rights, freedoms, but also democratic processes
and collective self-determination. Despite these effects, the current legal
framework does not reflect satisfactory safeguards of such interferences.
RS are specifically created for the purpose of shaping human behaviour by
exerting soft but persistent influences on individual liberty and shaping the
information available for exercising agency and independent decision-making. Explicit safeguards against the influence of RS over individuals may be
41

42

43

44

45

Andreas T Schmidt, ‘The Power to Nudge’ (2017) 111 American Political Science Review
404.
Tien T Nguyen and others, ‘Exploring the Filter Bubble: The Effect of Using Recommender
Systems on Content Diversity’, Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on
World Wide Web - WWW ’14 (ACM Press 2014) <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2566486.2568012> accessed 5 March 2021; Engin Bozdag, ‘Bias in Algorithmic
Filtering and Personalization’ (2013) 15 Ethics and Information Technology 209.
David D Luxton, Jennifer D June and Jonathan M Fairall, ‘Social Media and Suicide: A
Public Health Perspective’ (2012) 102 American Journal of Public Health S195.
Philip Baugut and Katharina Neumann, ‘Online News Media and Propaganda Influence
on Radicalized Individuals: Findings from Interviews with Islamist Prisoners and Former
Islamists’ (2020) 22 New Media & Society 1437; Mark Alfano and others, ‘Technologically
Scaffolded Atypical Cognition: The Case of YouTube’s Recommender System’ (2020)
Synthese <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-020-02724-x> accessed 5 March
2021.
Deena Abul-Fottouh, Melodie Yunju Song and Anatoliy Gruzd, ‘Examining Algorithmic
Biases in YouTube’s Recommendations of Vaccine Videos’ (2020) 140 International
Journal of Medical Informatics 104, 175; Harald Holone, ‘The Filter Bubble and its Effect
on Online Personal Health Information’ (2016) 57 Croatian Medical Journal 298.
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necessary because there is an inherent misalignment of interests between
those designing and deploying RS and the final users. Creators of RS may
seek to further their own commercial goals under a veneer of providing better service and more relevant content for users. Recent fieldwork with US
developers of RS identified a common goal of ‘hooking’ people and keeping
them on a particular platform,46 which was reflected in the way that the
RS was created. RS design and operation can take a multitude of shapes;
designer intent and desire can play a significant role in how RS ultimately
operate. While RS can be valuable to online users, they need to balance the
interests of designers and users to be a valuable solution.47 Due to the asymmetry of power and knowledge between designers and users in shaping and
understanding RS, a balance may be difficult and unlikely without some
form of regulation. Here, we briefly introduce the main architectures used in
RS, the data needed, as well as the role of a desired target variable for which
RS optimise. All of these features can have implications for the impact the
system has on individual autonomy. Furthermore, these features are also
currently within the exclusive domain of determination of RS designers and
developers.
In order to operate, RS require definitions of what the range of options
they can recommend are, what a ‘good’ recommendation is and how to identify it (i.e. a target variable which the systems seek to maximise), and how
their performance is evaluated,48 which allows for future improvements of
RS. There are a number of commonly used RS techniques that allow (semi-)
automation of recommendations. First, collaborative filtering focuses on
how multiple users have historically rated items, in order to predict ratings
of these items by other users who have not yet rated them. RS can do that
by grouping either users or items together, on the basis of similarity metrics.
The RS can then suggest content on the basis of what similar users liked or
on the basis of what items are similar to what a user and other similar users
have liked in the past.49 In contrast, a content-based RS models a user’s interests by analysing attributes of items that a specific user has interacted with
in the past, focusing on the user’s own behaviour to predict the user’s future
rating of a new item.50 Finally, the knowledge-based approach invites users
to directly specify their interests or requirements. These interests are then
46
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Nick Seaver, ‘Captivating Algorithms: Recommender Systems as Traps’ (2019) 24 Journal
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combined with the system’s pre-programmed domain knowledge to generate
recommendations.51 An example could be exploring real estate websites that
allow refining search results through numerous user-chosen filters. In reality,
RS often use hybrid architectural approaches.
RS also need different types of data about users and content or items to
operate, depending on the recommender technique used. 52 Data can be used
inter alia to assess the user’s interest in an item or to assess the similarity of
different users or of different items. RS can rely on both explicit and implicit
user feedback. Actions, e.g. recording users ‘liking’ or ‘sharing’ a piece of
content or even visiting a page, can serve as an implicit positive rating of that
content that RS then use to inform and reinforce their operation. More complex models can also include data about time and duration of interactions of
users, location, social or network information, as well as external domain
knowledge.53 Demographic data classifiers can especially boost the accuracy
of other RS techniques.54 Clearly, the three RS architectural approaches, as
well as the data used ascribe a different weight to a single user’s actions in
terms of their impact on determining the ultimate recommendations that
user receives.
A third key feature of RS is their determination of what ‘good’ recommendations are. “Good” is an inherently subjective term, especially in the context of personalisation. What is a “good” recommendation for one would
not be so for another. Moreover, to automate the computation and presentation of recommendations, ‘good’ needs to be defined mathematically. RS are
said to present items that are of interest or relevant to a particular user. 55
but how that should be translated into the RS’s design and what they should
optimise for is not predetermined. In machine learning (ML), the technology behind many RS, this is the key role of a target variable – a specific
and measurable variable that allows the ML model to calculate and predict
whether its performance (recommendation) will be poor or good, based on
data from past performance. In RS, the target variable is the measurable variable that designers have determined to be a good proxy measure of a “good”
recommendation – e.g., whether a user interacts with a piece of content,
whether they share it, whether they ‘like’ it etc. The RS then seeks to maximise this. The difficulty here lies in identifying which measurable variable(s)
can be used to represent a user’s positive reaction to a recommendation.
51
52
53
54
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The goals of service providers could be to increase the number or diversity of items sold, interacted with, increase user satisfaction and fidelity, or
simply improve understanding of what the user wants.56 The use of such a
variable will not always coincide with the users’ definition of what a ‘good’
recommendation is for them. Moreover, should a “good” recommendation
only be assessed on the basis of how a user perceives it or is there also space
for reflecting the reputability of a source or the content of the item being
recommended? Imagine the case that a person positively reacts to a piece of
content, advocating for racial inequality. Does that mean this was a “good”
recommendation? The interests of designers and the users seem to be satisfied with this recommendation being rated positively, but is there space to
discuss collective self-determination and the social interest? These are not
easy questions and there is not necessarily one correct answer. But they are,
nevertheless, decided every time a RS is created. For this reason, in the next
section we start our mapping of the pathways to regulating RS in order to
safeguard individual autonomy by first discussing the importance of regulating RS design and the role users can and should play within it.

III. R egulating

autonomy in recommender systems

Given the deep sources of tension between RS and autonomy, in this paper we
seek to explore the potential for regulatory interventions to safeguard autonomy by enhancing user empowerment in three ways: (i) through the design
and functioning of RS, utilising a law-by-design approach; (ii) through privacy and data protection rights to control RS data inputs, with a rights-based
approach; and (iii) through transparency in user interactions and co-shaping
of RS, with a process-based solution. We structure our analysis along these
three dimensions— algorithmic design, data inputs, and transparency — to
introduce specific regulatory options. At every step, we explore how autonomy is safeguarded in law today and the current state of art and propose
pathways for the future, as possible solutions to further enhance autonomy.

A. Designing Recommender Systems
New technologies of ML have fuelled the capacity of RS to increase their performance and issue more fitting recommendations. Generally, the improvements are due to the availability of training data allowing the respective
algorithms to be optimized in certain regards. However, the design goals and
the respective metrics towards which such an algorithm can be optimised
56
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vary. They range from engagement with the RS by spending time or buying
products to more general goals like accurate user information or presentation of information the user might not have been exposed to. Every system
communicates to a person in order to support and shape their decision-making. Considering that RS exert such an important influence on persons, the
argument can be made that there should be some ways for users to actively
influence them or, at the very least, there should be some expectation on the
part of the creators of RS to consider and account for the impact their work
might have on the autonomy of the intended users. Here we will explore how
regulation can influence algorithmic design and propose options to shape RS
design in an autonomy-enhancing manner through law.

i. State of the art of design for autonomy
In law, there is a growing amount of legislation that directly engages in
the design process. Notable and known examples relate to privacy and
IT-security, as provided for in arts 25 and 32 of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which lay down privacy and security by design obligations.57 Thereby, they transfer legal principles into the very design of technologies by mandating they be considered at every step of a technology’s
creation, use, and maintenance. Data protection and IT-security are to be
included in design processes as design goals of their own right, although ones
of many, balanced against qualifications like the cost of implementation.
This begs the question regarding whether regulators could add autonomy as
another design goal in the same fashion as data protection and privacy. An
analysis of the law shows that there are already first signs of including such
design goals.
Take for example art 29 of the draft EU DSA. This provision specifically
addresses RS in the context of online platforms. The transparency obligation in this article hints at a nascent autonomy by design principle. It provides that “[v]ery large online platforms that use recommender systems shall
set out in their terms and conditions …. any options for the recipients of
the service to modify or influence those main parameters that they may
have made available, including at least one option which is not based on
profiling…”. The obligation states that users are empowered to modify the
57

Peter Schaar, ‘Privacy by Design’ (2010) 3 Identity in the Information Society 267;
Dag Wiese Schartum, ‘Making Privacy by Design Operative’ (2016) 24 International
Journal of Law and Information Technology 151; Privacy and security by design obligations are also found in the current draft Indian data protection legislation. Saumyaa
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parameters of a RS. It indicates that, at the least, users can choose to receive
recommendations not based on personal profiling. This could mitigate the
role of personalisation that otherwise enhances the effectiveness of recommendations in achieving their pre-determined goal. Moreover, the DSA also
seeks to establish a duty on the part of large online platforms to manage
systemic risks arising from their platforms. The draft act mandates that large
online platforms should particularly take into account the negative effects on
fundamental rights, including the right to privacy, freedom of expression and
information, non-discrimination, and the rights of the child58 among these
risks. Platforms are explicitly tasked to consider ‘how their recommender
systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any
of the systemic risks’.59 They are then tasked with taking appropriate action
to mitigate identified risks, including by altering how their RS operate,60 and
their risk management activities are subject to independent audits61 and public disclosure.62 This provision will affect not only the process of RS design,
but also its long-term maintenance and review. It is geared towards pushing
platforms to reflect on and mitigate risks that arise as a result of their functioning and, especially, of the design and operation of their RS and advertisement systems. Both of these requirements in the DSA clearly indicate that
legislators are looking into checking the power and influence of RS, including by demanding that user autonomy is considered and enhanced by design.
Similarly, the recent European Commission proposal for an AI Act, while
it does not directly address RS, or user autonomy, demonstrates that it seeks
to safeguard individual autonomy in the face of powerful artificial intelligence (AI). Art 5(1)(a) of the AI Act seeks to ban any “system that deploys
subliminal techniques beyond a person’s consciousness in order to materially
distort a person’s behavior”, while art 5(1)(b) addresses systems that exploit
“any of the vulnerabilities of a specific group of persons due to their age,
physical or mental disability, in order to materially distort the behavior of a
person pertaining to that group”.63 These prohibitions of systematic utilisation of weaknesses of individuals clearly address limitations in their capacity
to exercise autonomy and highlight awareness of the persuasive powers of
AI.
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At the national level, an explicit example of inclusion of autonomy by
design can be found in the German Digital Healthcare Act.64 This act supports digital technologies like mobile apps by providing for funding schemes
from health insurances. The Digital Healthcare Act introduces Section 20(k)
(1) of the German Social Law Book V,65 which provides for measures to
enhance patients’ self-determination when it comes to digital applications
and telemedicine. Section 139(e)(2) of the German Social Law Book V provides for requirements for health insurances to remunerate digital applications if the applications meet a set of criteria. One of these criteria are
positive effects on healthcare. The respective draft secondary legislation
mentions “patients’ sovereignty” as one of the decisive criteria of positive
effects. Thereby, patients’ sovereignty is one of the evaluation criteria that
designers of those apps would have to take into account even at the design
stage if they want their app to be covered by health insurance.
An autonomy-by-design requirement could take different forms. It could
require RS designers to mitigate and minimise the risks their systems pose
to autonomy or it could require them to consider how to maximise and proactively help realise individual autonomy in the design of their technologies.66 One example for the latter approach would be the technology clause
in art 4(g) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (UNCRPD) which obliges states “[t]o undertake or promote
research and development of, and to promote the availability and use of
new technologies, including information and communications technologies, mobility aids, devices and assistive technologies, suitable for persons
with disabilities, giving priority to technologies at an affordable cost”.67
This clause explicitly addresses the progressive realisation of autonomy in
technology and shows that in very specific cases the law can demand or
incentivise autonomy in technology. There are clearly instances of both logics
in existing legislation at multiple levels. Regulators should determine which
approach would be best-suited for their goals, perhaps taking a diversified
view depending on the application of RS.
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Regardless, these examples signify the general trend in legislation to consider autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination of users in the context
of algorithmic design. However, these examples are – to date – rather general. Therefore, the question arises—what regulatory possibilities are there
to apply autonomy-by-design principles in real life? The regulation of RS to
enhance autonomy can include a number of considerations and principles
for designers to keep in mind, however, a case-by-case approach would be
necessary to assess how precisely such principles are to be transposed into
algorithmic design. This is due to the fact that the actual risks of RS can
vary considerably, depending on their context of application. What tools
might exist to help fulfil this? What regulatory structures might be relevant
to establish in order to facilitate this? In the remainder of this section, we
look at more concrete opportunities for this.

ii. Ways to further enhance autonomy
Autonomy can be included as a regulatorily-mandated design goal for RS, as
discussed. This would require a clarity of whether its goal is to minimise negative impact on autonomy or also to maximise the positive and empowering
impact on individual autonomy. Beyond this, however, regulatory options
can distinguish between setting autonomy as a design goal to be implemented throughout the process of technology creation, or rather focusing on
the final impact of the technology on autonomy, perhaps through requiring
that it meet desirable standards for access to the market. In order to have a
better grasp on these choices, it is necessary to know about different concepts in the design of RS, as well as the links between algorithmic design and
individual autonomy which will be explained below.

a. User capacity and shared decision-making
A fundamental starting point for autonomy-enhancing algorithmic design is
a greater understanding of the factors that make up an autonomous human
decision in a human-machine interaction. Interdisciplinary research is necessary to understand the conditions under which a human decision could be
assumed to be independent. This is particularly important in order to delimit
whether a certain system is considered a recommender system or whether
human autonomy has shrunk so far that the system effectively operates as
an automated decision-making system. Several criteria have been introduced
as a delimitation. The competence of human recipients of recommendations
is one of them.68 Another question is the extent to which a decision could
68
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2021

RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS AND AUTONOMY

19

actually be influenced.69 So far, understanding the factors affecting human
capacity has been especially relevant in the context of current regulatory
approaches to automated decision-making systems processing personal data,
specifically as per Article 22 GDPR that lays down safeguards for such systems. Debates about when a system fulfils the definition of an automated
decision-making system have pushed such discussions forward. The answer
is necessarily binary: either a system is an automated decision-making system in the sense of art 22 GDPR or the provision does not apply. This is
relevant because, when discussing how different design approaches could
be used to enhance or mitigate impacts on individual autonomy, a greater
understanding of the relationship between suggestions and recommendations and individual decision-making is necessary. For example, in the case
of decision support systems, one could design a taxonomy that describes different levels of human-computer interaction ranging from simple filters to an
automated decision-making system. One factor guiding the different levels
of such a taxonomy could be the degree of autonomy that rests with the user
when interacting with the system, which could help assess the risk of direct
interaction with RS. Potential measures could be linked to the different level.
Such a taxonomy could describe the different levels of human autonomy in
the same way that levels of autonomy of humans are described for automated
vehicles. At the very least, such understanding would be necessary to ground
all subsequent regulatory and design activities around autonomy-by-design
for algorithms.

b. Serendipity and randomization
A technical aspect that directly shapes how and with what aim a recommendation nudges individuals is the process of choosing a target variable
and optimising RS. The optimisation process is crucial in machine learning.70 Setting the goals of optimisation is a key component of designing algorithms and an instance in which human agency can guide the way in which
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AI-systems operate.71 In supervised learning, designers also specify a concrete and measurable target variable that the algorithm is trained to seek to
optimise for.72 While some tasks are binary like image recognition of a horse
(it is or it isn’t a horse), RS have to carry out more complex computations to
predict whether showing a particular item to a user and at a particular order
will result in a higher or lower target variable. Above, we gave the example
of optimising for selling more or diverse items, but a target variable need not
perpetuate the commercial interests of the designers. A target variable could
also, for example, be used to mitigate the intentionally nudging impact RS
can have on user autonomy by introducing unexpected recommendations in
different ways – through serendipity, diversity, or randomisation.
The concept of serendipity centres around the question of how to recommend information that fits the interests of the respective person without recommendations being known or expected.73 Through item-based grouping, a
RS could help individuals with very obvious choices. A person looking for a
hammer will probably need nails. However, a more complex RS might also
be able to suggest a new system to hang something without damaging the
wall. A similar but distinct concept is diversity. Unlike serendipity, diverse
recommendations are not aimed at finding what the user is looking for in the
first place. Rather, they confront the user with content that is different from
what she or he expected.74 A system recommending job ads might include ads
that go beyond the imagination of the user, but which might also fit.
Finally, in contrast to serendipity, randomisation does not relate to the
actual fit of a recommendation to a user but selects alternatives outside of
what is recommended by the system. Randomisation can enhance the scope
of action of a system by allowing it to confront people with data outside of
the usual training. If a news RS is personalised in a way that operates as a filter bubble, curating content along a specific political stream, randomization
might break that up by including recommendations beyond the confines of
what the system can predict will be positively received by the user. In addition to enhancing the independence of users from the ‘will’ of the designers
of RS, randomisation can be a valuable and desired feature for risk management systems and applications of RS in public bodies exercising some form
71
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of oversight. One example is the system used by the German tax authority
to identify tax applications and recommend them for further human scrutiny. Section 88 of the German Tax Code provides for the necessity of a
randomized human control of this recommender system. One measure to
complement the automated risk assessment is the random selection of cases
for human review,75 irrespective of their risk level. This measure fulfils two
functions.76 First, it tests overall compliance, especially of the applications
with low risk levels. Second, it allows for the evaluation of the system itself,
as the risk management system should select certain applications in a random fashion for further review irrespective of their risk level. An additional
step in the system used by the German tax authority is the freedom of users
to completely sidestep it. Another requirement of the system is that officials
must have complete access to all applications and must be able to select cases
themselves. Thus, there are technical features which could serve as ‘breaks’
along the way from designer intent to user nudging, thus limiting the intentional influence RS exert on their users.

c. User control
While the steps in the previous section demonstrate ways in which the link
between designer interests and user influence through RS can be limited, user
autonomy and self-determination can also be enhanced through greater participation of users in the shaping of the RS they use – user control. There is
a vivid area of research that looks into whether and how users can influence
RS voluntarily. Currently, individuals can and often do contribute to their
information curation, e.g. by choosing whether to follow certain individuals, pages, channels or by blocking content from sources.77 However, user
control approaches go far beyond the ordinary acts of users providing profile
data or giving feedback.78 Instead, user controls entail more direct impact,
e.g. settings through which users actively tweak and change the underlying
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algorithms79 or can choose between different algorithms.80 It puts users in
the driver’s seat and enhances their autonomy. So far, the reported results of
experiments are promising. Users make active use of these possibilities, they
have a positive experience81 and such measures generally also increase their
trust.82 Therefore, user control is a design choice that can substantially add
to recommender systems enhancing autonomy. As discussed above, the draft
DSA also highlights user choice in shaping RS and in, at the very least, having a choice between a personalised and non-personalised system.
User control of algorithms has also attracted attention in the social media
industry. Twitter announced the research project “blue sky” that aims to
build an “app store for (…) algorithms”.83 The goal is decentralisation of
algorithms used by social media that allows users to control the algorithms
shaping the information they see. One element that goes beyond current
approaches in decentralised networks like Mastodon is the idea of creating
choice for content moderation algorithms. In a conversation with investors,
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey framed the idea as follows:
The problem of discovery around content is one that is easiest when
it is centralized, and that’s how we’ve operated for almost the past
15 years. But even that has some potential to shift. And one of the
things we brought up last year in our Senate testimonies … is giving more people choice around what relevance algorithms they’re
using for ranking algorithms you’re using. You can imagine a more
market-driven and marketplace approach to algorithms. And that is
something that not only we can host but we can participate in.84

This is one specific example of how user control could be implemented for
content moderation by creating a market for content moderation algorithms
which would give users a choice between different algorithms.
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d. A new freedom of association
As mentioned above, collaborative filtering RS techniques are based on
grouping ‘similar users’ together to drive the predictive power of the models.
Through profiling, RS classify and group users together. While measures of
user control would influence or change the ways in which people are profiled
or the way content is targeted to them, it is also possible to give users power
to influence how user groups are formed or, at the very least, how they themselves are grouped. This could be done, for example, through RS allowing
individuals to directly associate themselves with a certain group.85 Certain
RS are already exploring this opportunity with regard to gender. A famous
fashion RS explores the possibility of allowing users to be more fluid with
their gender for the purposes of recommending items to them. Instead of asking whether the user is male, female or something else, they want to know
whether somebody would feel male, female or something else.86 Generalising
this idea would mean that the possibility for users to choose a certain group,
category, or label they could be characterised with could be a design feature
of RS. This would transgress the notion of data protection and its focus on
data being correct and up-to-date. It would allow users to associate themselves with groups depending on their will at particular times. This would
function as a loose reminder of the freedom of association as a human right
in the sense that the freedom of association also encompasses the right to be
part or not to be part of a group.87
One might object to such a design feature with the argument that it might
harm the accuracy and the fit of the respective recommendation. There might
be also further burdens to the optimization of the respective system given
that the person choosing the group might not share many of its attributes.
Yet there are a number of potential autonomy-enhancing benefits of such an
approach. Firstly, certain circumstances may warrant such a feature. This
would be cases in which certain individuals have a strong and legitimate
interest not to be categorised in a rigid manner, but also where there are
85
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European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Nijhoff 1993); Jürgen Bröhmer,
‘Kapitel 19: Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit’ in Oliver Dörr, Rainer Grote and
Thilo Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG. 2: Kapitel 20 - 33, Register (2. Aufl, Mohr Siebeck
2013). Of course, the freedom of association as a human right requires some stability of the
respective group which would not be the case.
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no potential negative consequences from a recommendation based on the
user’s self-determined grouping. For example, in the case of gender, a fashion
recommendation would pose no harm regardless of gender specified, however health recommendations may be based on research that is biologically
gender-specific. Secondly, a freedom of association would also allow for the
intuitive self-determination of users who might not have expertise how the
system works but might gain some experience about the association with
certain groups, which produces the best outcomes for them. A limitation of
this approach is that it may be specific to RS that rely on a communicative
relationship between a human and a computer in which the ultimate decision
rests with the human being.

e. Inter-subjective autonomy
In all the above-mentioned cases, design features address autonomy at the
level of an individual user. However, this misses the importance of group
or collective autonomy. In the process of profiling and grouping users, an
influential decision could be made about which feature similarities are relevant, and thus become a group and which do not form a group of their own.
Thus, profiling constructs groups of users but leaves other potential groups
unconstructed. This provokes the important design question of whether
inter-subjective autonomy can also be exercised through the design of RS. Is
there a possibility for groups to determine themselves? This line of thinking
can draw upon different ideas such as pluralism or other conceptions focusing on the interests of developing states such as post-colonial computing.88
Inter-subjective autonomy requires design features for groups to influence
the design of RS, and at the very least to establish their existence in the ‘eyes’
of an algorithm. A first step would be to define certain classes that are not
present if categories like gender or ethnicity are narrowly constructed. As a
next step, if a group is constructed and this group can express its preferences,
it might be possible to allow this group to influence the respective recommender system in the ways described above.
What is clear from the foregoing discussion is that the way RS are designed
can shape the impact they have on individual and collective autonomy.
Moreover, we have shown that recent legislative initiatives show indications
for the requirement of designers and deployers to consider autonomy in the
process of creating RS. We have also introduced a number of technical design
88
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- CHI ’10 (ACM Press 2010) <http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1753326.1753522>
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measures that could either help minimise the intentional, human-designed
impact of RS on autonomy or can help maximise autonomy and empower RS
users. Nevertheless, we also highlighted that there are more decisions for regulators to make and clarify, including what a potential autonomy-by-design
obligation would entail – simply accounting for and mitigating the impact
RS have on autonomy or rather actively considering how to use technology
in a manner that empowers individuals to pursue their life paths. Moreover,
further research will be necessary to understand how to define and assess
degrees of human autonomy and independence in human-computer interaction, as well as whether and how different contexts of RS application justify a differential approach to implementing autonomy-by-design in practice.
Regardless, it is clear that design must be one of the regulatory pathways to
truly safeguarding autonomy.

B. Input: Governance of personal data
It would be unfair to say that individuals currently have no recourse to control how they are ‘seen’ and profiled, including by RS. Privacy and data
protection legislation have increasingly been adopted all over the world.
This is relevant to autonomy because through inferences, grouping, and
classification, RS can also interfere in the personal identity experience by,
for instance, classifying a profile in a manner not corresponding to the features or categories with which the user self-identifies.89 Moreover, the use of
automated inferences90 can reinforce biases, stereotypes, and stigmas, even
without people’s awareness. These inferences can significantly affect people’s
privacy, identity, and self-determination.91 In that context, data protection
regulation can be a tool to govern the development and use of RS. The question of how legal rights can empower individuals to shape the data input
of RS in a manner that safeguards individual autonomy is further explored
below.
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Milano, Taddeo and Floridi (n 2) 962.
In Europe, there is still no consensus on the classification of inferences made by automated systems based on information about people. For the Article 29 Working Party, it
would be classified as personal data and, then, protected under GDPR, but the Court of
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i. State of the art in European data protection law
The EU has the GDPR which does not regulate RS specifically, but rather
the collection and use of any personal data,92 including for profiling and
automated decision-making. The GDPR 93 plays an important role in safeguarding individual autonomy because it strengthens individual control over
personal data.94 It is addressed at public authorities and private actors alike.
It, therefore, fulfils the obligations of states to respect and protect human
rights in society. The regulation embodies the principle of informational
self-determination, setting specific obligations for data controllers while protecting and empowering individuals.95 There are a number of key features of
the current data protection legislation in this regard.

a. Consent
In order to ensure greater individual self-management of data,96 consent,
as an expression of free choice, self-determination and autonomy, plays
an important function in data protection.97 It is essential to the exercise of
individual control over personal data.98 The GDPR establishes explicit, free
and informed consent as one of the lawful bases of art 6, permitting the
processing of personal data and legitimizing algorithmic processing of personal data.99 Although there are other legal bases in the regulation, the data
92

93
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Personal data means “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
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Although this study was mostly based on the European scenario, it is worth mentioning
that the GDPR was a robust data protection regulation that inspired many other countries, not only on the drafting of their data protection bills but also stimulating a higher
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<https://www.giga-net.org/2019symposiumPapers/17_Shulga-Moskaya_PROTECTIONOF-PERSONAL-DATA.pdf> accessed 30 March 2021.
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Daniel J Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard
Law Review 1880.
Bart W Schermer, Bart Custers and Simone van der Hof, ‘The Crisis of Consent: How
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accessed 5 March 2021.
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subjects’ consent plays a central role in the law regarding autonomy, since it
allows genuine and informed individual control over an individual’s data.100
When consent is obtained in full compliance with the conditions imposed by
the GDPR, it is an effective tool to ensure users’ control whether or not personal data concerning them will be processed,101 which enables autonomy.
Consent can be an especially valuable and necessary safeguard in the context
of intrusive activities such as in the case of decision-making based solely on
automated processing that, in other circumstances, would be prohibited by
the law.102 The Article 29 Working Party, a former expert body providing
authoritative interpretations of European data protection law, furthermore
suggested that in most of the cases of algorithmic data processing, such as
in RS, which affect individual and collective autonomy, focus should be on
getting the user’s consent.103 Upon closer examination, there are a number of
requirements for ensuring consent actually safeguards individual autonomy,
which are not always easily met in practice.
According to art 4(11) of the GDPR, valid consent must be freely given,
specific, informed, and unambiguous, through a clear statement of affirmative action that indicates the data subject’s wishes and agreement to the processing of their personal data.104 It is vital that consent is informed, meaning
that individuals are provided sufficient information to understand what they
are asked to agree to, including what data would be processed, by whom and
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent under Regulation
2016/679’ (2018) WP259 rev.01 <https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.
cfm?item_id=623051> accessed 30 March 2021.
101
European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on Consent under Regulation
2016/679, Version 1.1’ (4 May 2020) 5 <https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/
edpb_guidelines_202005_consent_en.pdf> accessed 30 March 2021.
102
ibid 18.
103
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (n 100) 47.
104
ibid 5; European Data Protection Board (n 101) 7–18. To be considered valid in the terms
of the regulation, consent must be simultaneously:
(i) freely given – meaning a real choice and control for data subjects. If the user feels
compelled to consent or will endure negative effects by not consenting, consent will
not be considered informed, thus, invalid. Also, consent is not free when there is not an
option to refuse or withdraw consent without detriments – it must not be considered a
condition;
(ii) specific – users’ consent must be directed to one or more specific purposes, giving them
a choice in relation to each of these purposes (granularity). This enables control and
transparency;
(iii) informed – meaning that the controller, before obtaining consent, must provide users
with enough information to ensure informed decision making. For example, informing
users about what they are agreeing to and how to exercise their right to withdraw, if
necessary;
(iv) unambiguous indication of the data subjects’ wishes to authorize the processing of their
data – it must be given through an active motion or declaration by the user, making
clear and obvious that they accepted and understood the terms.
100
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for what purpose.105 This is linked to a right to receive information, necessary for the validity of consent.106 The importance of information is further
discussed also in Section III.C of this paper.
Consent must also be unambiguous and explicit in that, as clarified in
recital 32 of the GDPR, silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not be
accepted as consent. Despite the non-binding status of the GDPR’s recitals,
this provision reinforces the voluntary and non-mandatory nature of consent, as it must be actively given in order to maintain the individual’s control
over data.107 The inclusion of the obligation to inform users regarding the
possibility to withdraw consent confirms that it is reversible, which puts a
degree of control on the side of RSs’ users.108 The e-Privacy Directive109 also
requires informed and prior consent for all except the necessary technical
cookies on websites, rejecting opt-out mechanisms for all other cases, but
rather requiring explicit user action to indicate consent. This is positive for
the exercise of individual autonomy since the user must decide and express
their active choice for use of tracking technology, in a measure of opt-in.110
In the same vein, the European Court of Justice decided, in the case of Planet
49, that pre-selected checkboxes are insufficient to obtain valid consent for
placing cookies on users ‘systems, as it does not constitute an unambiguous
indication of their wishes.111
Finally, consent must be free in that the data subject is offered an effective
control over his data and, in the context of RS, has a genuine choice with
regard to accepting or declining (without detriments) the terms of the service.112 However, digital platforms which are the largest users of RS, fail to
provide real alternatives for consent, instead presenting the users with a ‘take
it or leave it’ choice.113 This undermines the requirement for ‘free’ consent,
105
106
107
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109

110
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ibid 7.
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201.
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thus affecting user autonomy and agency. In this case, the users’ control is
illusory, and consent could be questioned as a basis for the processing of
personal data that could be perceived as unlawful.114

b. Responsibilities of data controllers and processors
Apart from empowering users by giving them control over their personal
data through consent, the GDPR also enhances autonomy by balancing the
regulatory burden across the different key actors of the data network processing, especially in terms of the need for compliance of the obligations
related to the principles, accountability and data subject’s rights protection.115 Data controllers and processors are namely those responsible for processing personal data in compliance with a number of legal principles that
seek to establish a general framework that balances the interests of individuals with the controllers’ and processors’. For example, art 7 (1) and recital
42 of the GDPR place the burden of demonstrating the compliance with the
requirements of valid consent on data controllers. Moreover, even with the
person’s consent, both data controller and processor still must comply with
data protection principles of GDPR’s art 5(1) and (2),116 which are: (a) lawfulness, fairness and transparency; (b) purpose limitation; (c) data minimisation; (d) accuracy; (e) storage limitation; (f) integrity and confidentiality; (2)
accountability. Also, the processing must be legitimized by one of the legal
bases presented in art 6 (1), attached to specific purposes, and the personal
data involved has to be accurate, updated, adequate, relevant and strictly
limited to what is necessary for this purpose that was accepted by the user in
the moment of consent. Thus, for instance, even in the case of personal data
processing in RS based on consent, this would not legitimize the collection of
excessive data in relation to a particular purpose.117 The GDPR requires even
stronger compliance when the processing involves “special categories of personal data,”118 which demands a second layer of legal basis, which are presented in art 9(2)of the GDPR. Therefore, if the RS is based on the processing
of sensitive data, it would imply a higher data processing risk which leads
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118
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1575.
European Data Protection Board (n 101) 5.
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to the necessity of enhanced compliance and stronger safeguards. Thus, the
GDPR imposes significant obligations and requirements on data controllers
in order to preserve and strengthen human autonomy.

c. Data protection rights for empowering individuals
In the monitored, surveilled and data-driven society, the safeguard of individual and collective autonomy online must also rely on a data protection
subject’s rights, as they derive logically from the aforementioned data protection principles. These rights are intended to empower users to control what
happens to their data. Following the GDPR’s principle of accountability, the
key actors of RS’s data processing will need to demonstrate their compliance with the regulation in general, and specifically that they can provide
data subjects’ rights through effective mechanisms and internal processes.119
In that sense, GDPR embodies important data subject’s rights, actionable
against the controller during all the steps of processing. This includes the
moment of creating the profile and also when making the automated decision about the user, based on his profile, with the purpose to recommend
items. Even where a user consents to their personal data being processed, for
example, the rights of arts 15-20 of the GDPR are still applicable,120 which
enable users to, inter alia, supervise the processing of their data and, when
necessary, make updates, ask for additional information or even object to the
processing of their data.121
Among the key rights is the right to be informed. As a consequence of the
principle of transparency (art 5(1)(a) and recital 60 GDPR), RS’s controllers must proactively inform data subjects about their rights, the existence
of data processing and all information related to it, including its purposes,
besides a clear, meaningful and understandable explanation of how profile
and RS techniques work,122 which is provided in arts 13 and 14 of GDPR.
These provisions encompass the right of the data subjects to receive information from the controller, who has the legal obligation to inform them,
even without request. According to art 12, the controller must freely provide
information to the data subject, in a concise, transparent, accessible, and
119
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eBooks 2018).
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processing. However, a similar outcome is possible, since people can withdraw consent at
any time, as easy as giving it and without detriments; ibid 21, 22, 30.
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easy way, and also facilitate the exercise of their rights under arts 15 to 22,
which are: right to access, to rectification, to erasure, to processing restriction, to data portability, to object to processing, and not to be subject to a
decision based solely on automated processing.123
The right to access, under art 15 and recital 63, reinforces the right to
information of the previous articles, as it allows individuals to actively
request information from the controller. In this sense, people may require
confirmation of the existence of personal data processing concerning them
and also the presence of automated decision-making for recommendation,
which can be used for profiling. Where that is the case, the subject must be
able to access his personal data, all information related to its processing and
also meaningful information about the logic involved in the automated profiling techniques. This access may also enable the exercise of other important
rights (depending on the situation and legal basis), such as rectification to
update or amend inaccuracies (art 16 GDPR), erasure (art 17 GDPR), restriction of processing (art 18 GDPR) and object (art 21 GDPR).
In terms of individual self-determination, as an expression of autonomy,
the right to information and access to personal data is a powerful instrument,
since it provides users with the fundamental basis to understand the processing of their data, the RS’s techniques and, thus, to make informed decisions
accordingly.124 In some circumstances, these rights may give people greater
knowledge about the logic involved in the recommendations they receive,
which allows them to exercise other rights, for example rights of rectification, erasure and portability.125 According to the European Data Protection
Supervisor, the right to data portability would allow people to use data for
their own purposes and exercise their option to change information service
providers.126 Thus, it is understood as an expression of individual autonomy
and empowerment, as it enables individuals to access and then transfer their
personal data from one platform to another, without detriments.127 This also
123
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serves to enhance competition between service providers and could make
it an important competitive feature, insofar as how individuals assess and
perceive the digital services they can choose from and the adequacy of the
treatment of their data. This is confirmed by GDPR’s recital 68 that sustains
the idea of data portability rights as a form of strengthening users’ control
over their own data, where the processing happens by automated means.
By setting these principles and rights, the GDPR effectively safeguards the
power of individuals to exercise their autonomy by managing their data in
line with their preferences.128 Moreover, compliance with the GDPR also
ensures companies and governments respect and fulfil the individual’s rights
and freedoms.

ii. Ways to further enhance autonomy
a. Truly informed exercise of rights
Despite the guarantees and protections afforded by the GDPR to individuals
to empower them in the control of their personal data, some of its provisions
are still difficult or inconvenient for controllers to abide by. One such example
is the issue of truly informed consent. In practice, the consent often incorporated in the privacy policies of large platforms can be perceived as ineffective. Instead of empowering users, it operates as a way to legitimize business
models of the information economy to “adapt” to the GDPR rules.129 This
scenario may deprive individuals’ agency since the consent given by the user
is rarely informed in an adequate way, but rather a condition to access the
service.130 Given the impossibility of negotiating the terms of service, people
tend to focus on the immediate benefit (access to a product or service online),
to the detriment of the possible long-term harm to their privacy, which can
reinforce the loss of control over their data.131 This is especially the case
when these platforms embody algorithm-based profiling, nudging and even
manipulation, as is the case in RS.
Another reason behind the difficulty of attaining truly informed consent
is the challenges for individuals to actually understand how their personal
data is processed, and to what end, by AI techniques. These techniques may
128
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(eds), Políticas, Internet e Sociedad (Instituto de Referência em Internet e Sociedade 2019).
Varshney (n 39).
Bioni (n 99).

2021

RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS AND AUTONOMY

33

be technically opaque and unpredictable, considered “black boxes” or may
be protected by trade secrecy. Both these types of protections are further discussed in Section III.C and may hinder the right to information and measures
of explanation and transparency that are essential to the effective exercise of
autonomy through consent and the data subject’s rights, mainly those rights
associated with information and access. Sophisticated AI algorithms used in
RS are not easily explainable to data subjects and sometimes even for controllers, as the technology may operate in unpredictable ways.132 Therefore,
individuals are placed in a situation of informational, technical and economic asymmetry, where the lack of foresight makes it difficult to ensure
informed consent and, consequently, autonomy.133 Moreover, individuals
may also be confronted with the controllers’ interests related to intellectual
property and industrial secrecy134 which further obfuscates the information
necessary for them to exercise their rights in an informed way.
A possible new e-Privacy Regulation, still in the draft and discussion
phase, may help address some challenges around making consent actionable without overwhelming users.135 On January 5, 2021, despite some criticism,136 the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the European Union
published the 14th draft of the regulation, which is simpler and aligned with
the GDPR137 and would replace the current e-Privacy Directive. In line with
132
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the idea of giving greater control to users and thus guaranteeing their autonomy, the draft focuses on consent for the treatment of electronic communication data, a wider category of data than personal data. Consent is required
whether for the processing of the content of electronic communication data,
metadata or information from the terminal equipment of the user. Although
the draft refers to the GDPR’s definition of consent, the document attempts
to address some of the problems associated with that consent, such as overloading requests or mandatory consent to access certain services. Among
the possible solutions raised in the draft is the possibility of implementing
technical means in electronic communications software to allow specific and
informed consent through transparent and easy settings for users. Thus, it
would allow end users, in a transparent and friendly manner, to manage consent for the storage and access to data stored on their terminal equipment,
easily configuring, changing, and withdrawing consent at any time.138

b. Greater control over inferred data
Greater transparency and information may be especially important in the
case of inferred data where individuals do not directly provide information
about themselves, but instead assumptions about them are made on the basis
of other data and their behaviour. More control of individuals over the way
they are viewed and the assumptions made about them may be desirable. RS
may use data to create inferences about a person on the basis of which they
make recommendations that may interfere in their behaviour, thus giving rise
to a risk to individual reputation, privacy, self-determination and autonomy.
Even though the current GDPR framework provides for detailed governance
of personal data that could be input into RS, it still lacks protection against
how data is subsequently evaluated.139 Thus, we still face accountability gaps
in the GDPR; for instance, for data processing related to inferences that
may be inaccurate, biased, and even sensitive.140 This could especially be a
problem in situations where inferences relate to data that would otherwise be
considered sensitive, e.g. gender, sexual orientation or religious beliefs. Such
inferences could, moreover, be based on anonymous or non-personal data –
another type of data not covered by the GDPR but that could nevertheless
pose risks to data subjects.141 To cover these gaps, the GDPR should include
not only personal data, but also the accuracy of decision-making processes
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and the assessment of the reasonableness of inferential analysis carried out
by algorithms.142
The draft e-Privacy Regulation also demonstrates that safeguards are necessary for data beyond personal data. In its current version, this regulation
would be broader than the GDPR, since it is not limited to the processing of
personal data; rather, it is applicable to electronic communications data.143
This incorporates both the content and the metadata of these communications, which may include sensitive information, even if not classified as
personal data, such as website visited, geographical location, time, date and
duration of some website’s use.144 This information may be used in RS’s data
processing and monitoring techniques in order to create users, profiles and
would now be protected.
Some have suggested the existence of a new right to reasonable inferences,
which would also provide for the associated right to challenge unreasonable high-risk assumptions.145 This possibility would enable individuals to
object to certain inferences or the irrelevance, lack of confidence or inaccuracy of data used to create those inferences, going beyond the current right
of individuals to rectify their personal data by correcting inaccurate data.
As a result, these practices would empower individuals to exercise control
over their data, reinforcing the right to access and rectification, while also
complementing the right to challenge solely automated decisions, including
profiling.146 This could also help implement in practice the above-mentioned
freedom of association that could allow individuals to freely choose which
groups or labels they are or are not associated with.

c. Impact assessments going beyond data protection
Another way of enhancing individual autonomy through data protection is
by providing actionable tools for those handling personal data to appropriately and lawfully handle data. One option is for providers of RS to implement data protection risk and impact assessments, in accordance with art
35 of the GDPR and as a best practice. The draft e-Privacy Regulation also
establishes obligations or advice for the implementation of impact assessments, referring to the already existing art 35 of the GDPR. Even though
the legal provisions of the GDPR mainly deal with issues related to privacy,
the risks that RS give effect to make it recommendable to go further. RS
142
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designers or implementers could implement algorithm audits and algorithmic impact assessments to map the RS risks related to legal compliance
and ethical guidelines, human rights, especially autonomy, but also fairness
(bias audits), non-discrimination, due process and ensuring the public oversight.147 Audits can help secure compliance with existing legal and ethical
standards, while algorithmic impact assessment, including algorithmic risk
assessment and impact evaluation, may help assess possible societal impacts
on the autonomy of RS before and during its implementation in real life.148 By
acting to alleviate any shortcomings identified, risk assessments and audits,
particularly through agile design decisions, could serve as valuable governance tools to help RS creators strengthen autonomy and self-determination
of their users in practice.

d. Recent legislative initiatives
The recent legislative initiatives of, i.e. the aforementioned DSA and the AI
Act, also have a role to play in further developing data governance frameworks and data rights of individuals. As said before, the DSA devoted considerable attention to RS, especially in art 29 and recital 62. This provision
addresses “very large platforms” that use RS, requiring them to set their
terms and conditions in a clear, accessible, and comprehensible manner to
inform users of the RS and, where possible, inform them of options to influence the recommendations. This draft’s obligation would empower users
through information, being a step beyond the focus of the GDPR on users’
ability to exercise control over their data.149 Although it is noteworthy that
the DSA is a first initiative to specifically address RS, the proposal is only
applicable to large online platforms and is still vague. It does not explain the
possible options that users should have, in terms of influencing recommendations sent to them nor a way to align this with other fundamental rights. For
the regulation to effectively give users control over their data in RS, the draft
could, for example, require the implementation of democratic and fairer recommender algorithms or enable users to effectively choose between different
recommendation algorithms, including from third parties.150
147
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In addition, the European Commission has expressed awareness of the
need to address the specific challenges that AI systems may create.151 Thus,
the recently proposed AI Act aims to foster the development of an ecosystem of trust in AI in Europe.152 RS would fall within the definition of AI
within the draft Act153 and depending on the scope of the RS, it could be
classified in one of the four levels of risk created by the AI Act. The proposal
follows a risk-based approach, defining the possible uses of AI according to
whether they create an unacceptable, high, limited or minimal risk to people’s security and fundamental rights. According to recital 14, depending on
the intensity and the scope of the risks of AI systems, some systems may be
prohibited. Indeed, as was mentioned in the introduction, AI systems developed with a “significant potential to manipulate persons through subliminal
techniques (…) or exploit vulnerabilities (…) in order to materially distort
their behaviour in a manner that is likely to cause them or another person
psychological or physical harm” would be prohibited by the AI Act, as they
are considered a threat to safety, livelihoods and rights of people. Where
manipulative or exploitative practices, facilitated by AI, are not prohibited,
the draft proposal points to other potential legal safeguards to ensure individuals are sufficiently informed and can freely choose whether or not to be
subjected to profiling that could affect their behaviour - data protection law,
consumer protection, or digital services legislation.154 The latter legislative
body, particularly, may soon be modernised in the EU through the DSA.
Nevertheless, as we have seen so far, there are gaps in some of these mentioned legal frameworks in terms of the protection they offer against manipulation or influence through RS.
Where the requirements for prohibition are not met, high-risk AI applications are subject to strict requirements of risk management and reporting on
data governance, transparency, human oversight, accuracy, robustness, and
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cybersecurity.155 Depending on the purposes, the modalities of use and the
function performed by the RS, it could be classified as high-risk, as it may
create threats to peoples’ health, safety or fundamental rights. The list of
high-risk AI systems is focused on specific use cases in the fields of biometric identification, management of critical infrastructure, education, employment, access to public services or essential private services, law enforcement,
border control, or the administration of justice.156 The list specifically
focuses on systems used to make decisions, and as such, it is an open question whether RS would fall within that scope, given their ‘advisory’ role in
shaping human decision-making. Nevertheless, it is conceivable to imagine
RS used to provide rankings that could then be used to prioritise needs and
direct resources or workflow, for example, in the context of education or
employment.
Where the requirements for meeting the high-risk threshold are also not
met, AI systems are subject to significantly fewer obligations; yet, they are
important for safeguarding individual autonomy. In such cases, a RS would
need to comply with certain transparency obligations, such as the delivery of
information to users that they are interacting with an AI, in order to allow
their informed decision.157 The multiple new requirements arising from the
AI Act would overall have an impact on the way RS are designed, created,
and maintained, and create an incentive to RS’s providers to promote compliance by design in the case of RS.158
To sum up, the GDPR and other digital technology-related regulations
like the draft DSA, the draft AI Act, and the draft e-Privacy Regulation,
try to develop a stronger culture of informational self-determination associated with data protection in the context of RS and are important to ensure
enhanced control, through the effective exercise of data subjects’ rights and
lawful consent. For example, after the GDPR adoption and the last amendments in the current e-Privacy Directive, European consumers encountered
significantly less unconditional usage of persistent cookies when using the
Internet and its services.159 Already in the early days of the GDPR, in 2018,
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transparency measures increased 4.9%; more websites had privacy policies
and informed their users about cookies practices, data subjects’ rights and
the legal basis for processing of personal data.160 Nevertheless, current privacy-related regulations alone might not be considered sufficient to guarantee an adequate level of autonomy on matters specific to autonomy and
RS. the strengthening of users’ protection is necessary and examples exist,
such as the changes brought by the new draft of the e-Privacy Regulation,
the implementation of limits, obligations and requirements for AI systems in
the AI Act (that would be enforced and supervised by the European Artificial
Intelligence Board and national authorities within the Member States), and
the creation of new rights, such as the right to reasonable inferences. All
of these are important steps towards safeguarding autonomy. In parallel,
solutions to embed autonomy in the design of RS through the prism of data
governance, as well as solutions coming proactively from the private sector,161 society and technology (for example, the law-by-design approach and
its implementation through audits and risk assessments) should be considered and fostered simultaneously.

C. Output: Communication and Transparency
A final aspect where regulation can play a key role in enhancing individual
autonomy is through transparency. It is a widely supported principle in AI
ethics frameworks162 and is one of the five OECD AI Principles,163 endorsed
by the G20 countries,164 as well as a requirement in the EU’s Trustworthy AI
160
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guidelines.165 Transparency has also been a key feature of the recently proposed EU AI Act and DSA. Importantly, transparency can play a key role in
ensuring and safeguarding individual autonomy in the context of RS. Firstly,
there is a positive obligation inherent in the principle of respect for autonomy
to disclose information necessary to foster autonomous decision-making.166
Agency is necessary for autonomy and it requires that individuals have sufficient understanding of the environment within which they decide and act,
as well as of the meaning and consequences of their decisions.167 This is
reflected, for example, in the notion of informed consent in the GDPR and
elaborated in the previous section.168 Secondly, transparency can safeguard
individual freedom by ensuring individuals can control or hold accountable those who may exert control or influence over them, thus further safeguarding self-determination and autonomy. Transparency can also serve to
enhance the quality and impact of RS. Explaining to users how an individual recommendation has been made may enhance trust and acceptance by
users.169 Moreover, understanding the model’s operation can empower users
to adjust their interaction with the RS to produce more desirable recommendations,170 ultimately improving the service.
Transparency is, however, not a simple matter to regulate. First, what
transparency means and what it covers is not a straightforward question.
Moreover, transparency may conflict with protecting commercially sensitive or valuable information, as well as private information regarding other
users. How to present information so that it is understandable to its target
recipients and who they are is a further challenge. Therefore, a nuanced consideration is necessary in order to ensure transparency of RS appropriately
safeguards individual autonomy. We define transparency as the availability of information about an actor’s workings or performance that allows
monitoring or control from others171 in order to focus on its role as a tool
of accountability. In the rest of this section, we explore the current state of
165

166
167
168
169

170

171

High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI’
(2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation/guidelines> accessed 27
April 2020.
Beauchamp and Childress (n 39) 104.
ibid 102.
GDPR, art 6(1)(a).
Henriette Cramer and others, ‘The Effects of Transparency on Trust in and Acceptance of a
Content-Based Art Recommender’ (2008) 18 User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction
455.
Donghee Shin, ‘User Perceptions of Algorithmic Decisions in the Personalized AI System:
Perceptual Evaluation of Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Explainability’
(2020) 64 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 541, 549.
Albert Meijer, ‘Transparency’ in Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin and Thomas Schillemans
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014).

2021

RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS AND AUTONOMY

41

transparency regulation and explore how it interacts with the domains of
intellectual property law, data protection law, as well as how it is represented
in the recently proposed draft Digital Services Act and AI Act. We then present the questions that regulators will methodically and purposefully need
to tackle, in order to shape transparency to effectively yet proportionately
safeguard individual autonomy.

i. State of the art concerning transparency obligations
a. Intellectual property law
Transparency of RS can both be facilitated and hindered by intellectual property (IP) law. Patents grant privileged rights to innovators in exchange for
transparency that fosters scientific progress by sharing valuable and breakthrough insights. Mechanisms used in recommender and ranking systems
may be patented172 which could be a building block of their transparency.
However, there are barriers to relying on patents for transparency. Firstly,
the patentability of AI and ML is a matter of ongoing debate. The European
Patent Convention excludes ‘programs for computers’ from being patentable
inventions173 and artificial intelligence and machine learning may be considered too abstract in nature to be patentable.174 However, specific models that
deliver a technical effect, such as targeting content to individuals in a particular manner, may be patentable if sufficiently innovative.175 Secondly, even
if patentable, the transparency provided by patents is targeted at experts, not
average users. Disclosure need only be ‘sufficiently clear and complete for it
to be carried out by a person skilled in the art’.176 This suggests extending
software patentability may be part of the solution, but the transparency it
provides, while valuable in advancing science, does not, as it stands, facilitate transparency to non-experts and lay persons. Finally, even where patents could deliver some form of transparency, the exclusive rights conferred
172
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on innovators are likely to hinder competition and, thus, limit consumer
choice and, by extension, the ability of individuals to exercise autonomy
when choosing a recommender system.
Where RS are not patentable, innovators may look to other forms of protection. Copyrighting of the AI code can offer limited protection, since it
does not extend to the principles and mechanics underlying the software, but
rather just to the code as such.177 Similar to how copyright protects written
works of art, the words of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet as they are written are protected from being copied, however the story of two tragic lovers
from rival families can be retold with different words and small changes to
the story. In this same manner, copyright law cannot sufficiently protect the
‘ideas’ of how particular AI technologies operate, but rather simply protect
their code, word-for-word. Handling AI models as trade secrets is often the
choice of innovators. Trade secrets protect any information that is commercially valuable, including a method of production or an algorithm formula,178
for as long as reasonable steps to keep it secret are maintained.179 Perhaps
the most notorious example of the conflict between transparency and trade
secrets came with the US case of Loomis v Wisconsin, where a criminal
defendant was denied access to a risk scoring algorithm used to inform
the judge’s decision in the case.180 That case illustrates the tension between
human rights and trade secrets. Such lack of transparency could place algorithms beyond the reach of legal assessments.181 IP law, thus, can present a
challenging field of law to navigate when discussing RS transparency to support individual autonomy. It either does not facilitate transparency for end
users and non-experts or it hinders transparency overall.

b. Data protection law
Transparency is also a key principle of personal data processing according
to art 5(1)(a) of the GDPR - the principle of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency and, in that capacity, could help individuals understand more about
what personal data of theirs is processed, how, and what rights they have
177
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in that regard. Recital 60 of the GDPR clarifies the obligation of data controllers to provide individuals with information that would be ‘necessary to
ensure fair and transparent processing.’ This is further detailed in the regulation with a number of proactive transparency and disclosure requirements,
as well as with rights on individuals to demand information (the right to
access). All information regarding ‘risks, rules, safeguards and rights’ related
to personal data processing and how to exercise rights should be clearly communicated with individuals.182 Individuals should also be made aware of the
existence and consequences of profiling,183 particularly relevant to the manner of operation of RS. This information could, in theory, enhance individual awareness of external influences, however users often do not read the
privacy policy documents where this information is recorded184 and when
they do, they might be confronted with vague or complicated text.
The GDPR could also provide individuals with glimpses into the process
behind the creation and operation of the RS. The GDPR allows individuals
to know how and by whom their personal data is handled and managed,185
and also the purpose of the processing,186 and they could receive copies of the
personal data controllers hold about them.187 This might help answer who,
and for what reason, is processing personal data or profiling individuals,
thus seeking to influence them. But there are limitations. Firstly, the specified purpose of processing might not reveal the specific goal of RS used. If
personal data is collected to help improve a service, it is not clear what a RS
would optimise for in order to improve such a service. Secondly, these rights
would not allow individuals to know which of all of their personal data that
is held by a controller are actually used or influential for the performance of
RS. This limits the insight into the RS’s logic that users could gain through
data protection rights.
Finally, the GDPR could also limit what information about RS could be
provided to individuals. It protects personal data from unauthorised disclosures.188 Training data is of vital importance to the performance of ML algorithms, often used in RS. For that reason, it is important to consider whether,
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and to what extent, training data should form part of relevant transparency
obligations, with due regard to the data protection rights of individuals
whose data may form part of such training data. Thus, the European data
protection law, as it currently stands, also leaves potential gaps in terms of
the use of transparency to support individual autonomy in a RS context.

c. Digital Services Act
The draft DSA also promotes transparency, particularly in RS. It requires
very large online platforms to disclose in a clear and accessible manner ‘the
main parameters used in their recommender systems.’189 Transparency and
usability, where there are options for users to modify or adjust the parameters of the RS, are also highlighted.190 Here, transparency is used to empower
users not only to understand the logic of the RS, but also to ensure that they
can shape it. The DSA also makes strides with regard to targeted advertising
transparency. Online advertisements are required to be clearly marked as
such, notably including information on the identity of the natural or legal
persons behind them, as well as ‘meaningful information about the main
parameters used to determine the recipient’ of the advertisement.191 While
consumer protection law already mandates advertisements to be clearly
marked,192 this obligation would allow insights into the purpose and manner
in which advertising seeks to target and influence individuals. Very large
platforms would also have to publish aggregate data about advertising,
including who ordered the advertisement, the intended recipients, as well as
the number of recipients.193 This might facilitate public accountability and
research regarding advertising practices.
The draft DSA also proposes transparency obligations that shed light on
the manner in which online platforms operate. A general obligation to be
transparent about content moderation and handling of illegal content is discussed.194 In addition, reporting duties for very large platforms are proposed,
189
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covering inter alia their assessments of systemic risks arising out of their
RS and targeted advertising systems195 and proportionate and effective risk
mitigation steps they have taken, including adapting their RS.196 The performance of this and other obligations is subject to independent auditing197
and reporting, also subject to disclosure.198 The information that has been
revealed to the public may be redacted to protect commercially confidential
information or the privacy of other users, but would still be accessible to
EU authorities.199 Such disclosures could allow some transparency to users
about the RS used and the way in which they operate, although it might
be redacted or technical. However, public oversight through EU authorities
would be ensured. This is a clear move towards embedding transparency
into the operation of very large platforms with a prominent role for transparency of RS. However, even here, the types of transparency presented and
their intended audiences are not all intended to safeguard the autonomy of
individual users. Rather, the transparency obligations are framed as a way
to ensure public oversight over the operation of highly impactful platforms.

d. The AI Act
The recently proposed EU AI Act also lays down a number of requirements
and obligations regarding the transparency and oversight of AI systems.
Most of these obligations, however, only apply to systems which are classified as ‘high risk.’200 If RS meet this standard, then a range of transparency
requirements would apply to them, including a documented and maintained
risk management system, 201 design that is “sufficiently transparent to enable
users to interpret the system’s output and use it appropriately”202 and that
allows for human oversight203 and technical documentation demonstrating
compliance with high-risk AI requirements. 204 These requirements include
information about the overall process of the system’s creation, maintenance
and oversight, relevant metrics, risks, and the system’s design specifications, general logic, and “the key design choices including the rationale and
assumptions made.”205 Thus, in the AI Act there are transparency obligations
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that cover both– the process of the system’s creation, as well as its internal
logic, architecture, performance and even extend to aspects of human-computer interaction (HCI). A publicly accessible EU database of high-risk AI
systems is also envisioned, albeit containing less detailed information. 206 The
draft AI Act also provides for some transparency obligations for AI systems
that are not considered to be high-risk, however, these are more modest. For
example, where natural persons interact with AI systems, they are informed
of their AI nature. 207 This makes some, but not fully sufficient, progress
towards ensuring individuals have enough information about RS to be aware
of and fully understand the way RS influence them. Even if RS are considered
“high-risk,” not all of the information maintained about them is intended to
be accessible to end-users or the public. Some of it is reserved for enabling
oversight by public authorities, subject to appropriate confidentiality safeguards.208 Nevertheless, a strong link to individual autonomy is the requirement to design “high-risk” AI systems in a manner that ensures humans can
understand and use their outputs, thus putting users in an empowered position. There is, however, scope to further consider and develop transparency
requirements for safeguarding autonomy of RS users.

ii. Towards more meaningful transparency
Transparency obligations as well as limitations to transparency exist in a
piecemeal manner across multiple legal frameworks. However, a coherent
and purposeful approach would be necessary, using individual autonomy
as the guiding “North Star” and goal of transparency. At the same time,
regulating transparency also has to take into account competing interests,
e.g. IP law, that may justify limited disclosure of information. This will
require defining transparency and its relevant dimensions – scope of disclosure, obligations and rights, proactive or demand-driven disclosure, and
intended recipients – in a purposeful manner that allows users to autonomously make their own informed decisions and also enables them to hold
those that seek to influence them accountable. This could be done by (1)
mediating the type and content of transparency obligations – both in terms
of what is disclosed, as well as how it is disclosed, or (2) by moderating the
recipients of information. These two aspects are interlinked, as information
disclosed to a particular recipient should be understandable and usable by its
intended recipient. Below, we highlight some of the challenges future regulation should account for.
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a. Defining the scope of transparency purposefully
A first step for regulators would be to define what transparency should cover,
with a view towards achieving specific objectives or goals. The content of
disclosures may depend on the individual case – on its context and impact
of the disclosure, as well as on the intended recipients of the information
and their goals. 209 Having a clear view of what functionalities transparency
should fulfil will help ensure that it is balanced and proportionate vis-a-vis
competing interests. Regulators can then choose from a range of transparency options. A fundamental question is whether the goal of transparency
is to inform end users and, thus, facilitate informed decision-making, or is
it to facilitate human oversight of RS with the goal of indirectly protecting
individual autonomy? Ideally, a complementary approach should be taken,
taking advantage of the strengths of both approaches. For example, transparency can be achieved by providing information that does not infringe on
trade secrets. Users can receive explanations about the RS’s operation or a
specific recommendation that allow them to understand the context and consequences of their actions, but that are not technical to the extent of breaching trade secrets. 210 Alternatively, if technical disclosures are necessary for an
assessment of the RS, this may be done by limiting disclosure to authorised
and independent organisations, similar to what is already practiced where
public authorities examine commercially sensitive data, such as in IP litigation. There are mechanisms to allow the disclosure of sensitive information
sufficiently to enable human control and oversight. Ideally, transparency
regulation will seek to combine the strengths and complementarity of both
approaches.
Once there is a clear goal for transparency to fulfil, regulators would need
to narrow down the precise definition and scope of transparency that would
allow them to achieve it. When it comes to a particular RS, we can differentiate between disclosing information about (1) the process of the creation of
the RS - process transparency and (2) the results of the process - the system,
its data and logic, performance, and results - outcome transparency. 211 Then,
regulators need to consider what is knowable about algorithmic systems
to identify the scope of desirable disclosure. What we can know about an
209
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algorithm includes information about (1) human involvement and decisions
made in the creation and implementation of a system, assumptions, goals,
intents; (2) about the type, features, qualities, provenance and legal terms
for the use of the data, as well as its management; and (3) about the model
itself – its type, performance metrics, metadata (date, version), thresholds,
assumptions, rules it includes, along with influential variables and weighting if known.212 Regulators need to consider which of this information they
would like disclosed to whom and in what shape in order to safeguard autonomy. As we saw above, the current and proposed legal framework provides
for a tapestry of transparency and disclosure obligations.
Aspects of both outcome and process transparency are necessary to safeguard autonomy. Outcome transparency is key to support individual agency
by highlighting how individual autonomy may be impacted. It could incorporate information about the model and how and why it operates. The
Consultative Committee on the Council of Europe’s Convention Hundred
and Eight suggests that in order to enable public scrutiny, a reasonable solution could be disclosures of the logics of an AI algorithm in general, covering its overall operation, the type of expected input and output data, the
variables and weights used by the algorithm, as well as details about its
architecture. 213 Moreover, previous work on transparency in the context of
nudging highlights the need for being transparent that a particular technique
of nudging is used to achieve a particular goal, 214 as well as highlighting specific instances of nudging, making them identifiable to nudgees.215 This is in
line with the requirement in the EU’s Guidelines for Trustworthy AI that AI
systems be clearly identified as such to end-users along with information on
the system’s capabilities, limitations, and purpose216 and can be encompassed
within outcome transparency.
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Instead, process transparency is vital to ensure accountability of those
designing and creating RS and justifiability of the design choices made, for
example what a RS is optimising for and which user data it considers influential. It could cover information about the human involvement in the RS’s
creation, as well as the data used and decisions made to tailor and optimise
the model. Transparency of the data used is highlighted in a number of policies. In the EU’s Guidelines for Trustworthy AI transparency should cover
data traceability and provenance. 217 The Council of Europe, in its Report on
AI, similarly highlights that transparency of data used to train and operate
an algorithm.218 Where information about the logic of operation of a RS
may be unknowable due to its complexity (see point 2.c. below), process
transparency could offer an important replacement mechanism of checks
and balances. As the EU’s Guidelines on Trustworthy AI suggest, where
explanations of the way systems operate are not possible, other types of
transparency should be prioritised. 219

b. Understandable disclosure formats
The goal of regulating for transparency should be to provide higher quality
information rather than simply “more” information. 220 Information should
be provided to its intended recipients in a useful manner and, following the
example of the GDPR, should be easily accessible, understandable, concise,
using “clear and plain language.”221 Regulation could standardise procedures and formats for disclosure, 222 including by considering mechanisms
like standardised icons, certification schemes or seals. 223 Research from
human-computer interaction (HCI) could help shed light on how information
can be intuitively presented 224 or to help identify what explanations users and
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experts think are necessary, as well as how they can be provided.225 In fact,
there are already some existing tools that could help communicate outcome
and process transparency. For outcome transparency, information about
models can be provided through model cards, with an overview of model
performance, its intended uses, limitations, and key architectural features. 226
Data transparency can be achieved by sharing ‘definitions and meanings of
variables in the data, as well as how they are measured’.227 Documents like
Datasheets or Dataset Nutrition Labels can play a role to record qualities
of the data, as well as rationale for human manipulations.228 Moreover,
transparency of specific instances of recommendations could be achieved
by highlighting them through the use of borders around elements or textual notifications. More research will be necessary to determine when digital
elements on a page constitute a ‘nudge’ and how to best (visually) represent
this to make individuals aware of it. 229 This may, however, be necessary
especially for the DSA-proposed transparency and highlighting of targeted
advertising. On the other hand, process transparency that provides insights
into the creation of RS is also desirable. Information on human involvement
can be collected progressively throughout the process of RS creation through
end-to-end documentation intended to support accountability and auditability. 230 Relevant aspects for communication to individuals or authorities
can then be extracted. This may require changes to internal work processes;
however, this is nothing new. Legal acts, including the GDPR, often require
both technical and organisational measures for compliance with their obligations. 231 It is important, however, that transparency regulation considers
how to ensure disclosed information is useful and fit for purposes of safeguarding autonomy.
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c. Explainability and oversight
A final challenge that transparency regulation must tackle is the potential
use of complex ML systems in ML. Where sophisticated ML algorithms
are used, it may be impossible to know how and why systems operate the
way they do232 or how and why an individual has been classified a certain
way and, therefore, receives a certain algorithmic output. 233 This problem,
labelled ‘black box’ AI, addresses the necessity of explainable AI for trust
and legal accountability. 234 Where AI is unexplainable, some types of transparency may be difficult to realise. However, there are two possible solutions.
First, regulators may consider whether there is a need to limit the use of
unexplainable and uninterpretable AI models.235 Depending on the context,
interpretability and transparency of AI models may be prioritised to ensure
the legal compliance236 of RS models used. For example, in the draft AI Act,
high risk AI systems and their outputs have to be sufficiently interpretable to
be used appropriately.237 Some argue that interpretable models may perform
just as well as ‘black box’ models, 238 with some initial supportive research in
the area. 239 Second, where RS are uninterpretable, other information about
the RS is still knowable. Process transparency is always possible. We might
also disclose an algorithm’s purpose or optimisation goal, design and basic

232
233

234

235

236

237
238

239

Lembcke and others (n 16) 10.
Jenna Burrell, ‘How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms’ [2016] 3 Big Data & Society 205395171562251.
Giulia Vilone and Luca Longo, ‘Explainable Artificial Intelligence: A Systematic Review’
[2020] arXiv:2006.00093 [cs] <http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.00093> accessed 6 March
2021; Finale Doshi-Velez and others, ‘Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role
of Explanation’ [2019] arXiv:1711.01134 [cs, stat] <http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01134>
accessed 6 March 2021; Finale Doshi-Velez and Been Kim, ‘Towards A Rigorous Science
of Interpretable Machine Learning’ [2017] arXiv:1702.08608 [cs, stat] <http://arxiv.org/
abs/1702.08608> accessed 6 March 2021.
Lembcke and others (n 16); Burrell (n 233); Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The
Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (1st edn, Harvard University
Press 2015).
German AI Strategy specifically mentions the need for transparency in the way AI operates and produces outputs – the “criteria, objectives, logic” to assess compliance with
legal requirements, including that of non-discrimination. German Federal Government,
‘Artificial Intelligence Strategy’ (2018) 16, 38 <https://www.ki-strategie-deutschland.de/
home.html>.
AI Act, art 13(1).
Cynthia Rudin, ‘Stop Explaining Black Box Machine Learning Models for High Stakes
Decisions and Use Interpretable Models Instead’ (2019) 1 Nature Machine Intelligence
206; Cynthia Rudin and Joanna Radin, ‘Why are we Using Black Box Models in AI When
we don’t need To? A Lesson From an Explainable AI Competition’ (2019) 1 Harvard Data
Science Review <https://hdsr.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/f9kuryi8> accessed 6 March 2021.
Elaine Angelino and others, ‘Learning Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists for Categorical Data’
[2018] arXiv:1704.01701 [cs, stat] <http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01701> accessed 8 April
2021.

52

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

functionalities, 240 such as the model’s architecture and performance and
could even cover the data processed on an individual basis. This information
could be provided for oversight by sufficiently resourced public authorities.
For example, “professional means, such as external auditors assessing the
code (…) or (…) interdisciplinary partnerships” can be ways to ensure the
ethical justifiability of uninterpretable algorithms used to shape individual
choices. 241 The key is to provide information that enables meaningful human
control that could then itself consider the impact of the system on autonomy.
In conclusion, transparency is a potentially powerful tool to safeguard
autonomy; and has multiple dimensions that can be moulded by a regulator
to achieve a desired purpose of enhancing autonomy. Technology-specific
challenges of RS, such as uninterpretability, do not pose a barrier to all relevant transparency, nor do legal challenges, such as IP law or data protection
law. By shaping the scope of transparency, its intended percipients, and usability, regulators could create a coherent framework to utilise the potential
of algorithmic transparency for autonomy.

IV. Conclusion
Recommender systems, by their very nature and intended use, affect individual autonomy and, boosted by profiling and micro targeting, are able
to shape human thought and action. Ultimately, this affects individual and
collective autonomy and self-determination, as well as human rights. The
current regulatory framework, as it exists, leaves gaps in terms of ensuring
accountability and oversight of the creation, use, operation, and impacts of
RS. Exercising such power, however, cannot be permissible without appropriate checks and balances. In this paper, we mapped the current and recent
European legislative trends with relevance to RS and their impact on autonomy to highlight how, through different angles and with different justifications, there is a clear indication that this is an issue very much on the policy
agenda. We proposed a set of considerations and possibilities for the future
development of a regulatory framework that can appropriately control the
exercise of such power over user autonomy. We structured our analysis to
address RS’s design (Section III.A), the data they use (Section III.B), and the
information about them which is presented to end users or qualified third
parties (Section III.C). Key steps that can serve to safeguard or promote
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individual autonomy are possible at each of these junctions in the creation
and operation of RS.
A possible autonomy-by-design approach could empower the self-determined and directed use of RS by individuals, aligning RS with the general
preferences of users. This can be enabled inter alia by architectures of user
control, user shaping algorithms or choosing between algorithms. This idea
is already foreshadowed in current legislative proposals and in projects in the
IT-industry. Moreover, technical additions or modifications of RS may also
diminish the manipulative impact that RS have on individual experiences,
e.g., by including serendipity or randomisation techniques. A rights-based
approach could also empower users to control the way their data is processed
and their digital reflections and the GDPR can help mitigate some of the
risks created by RS242 through the data subjects’ rights and principles and
obligations for controllers it establishes. However, as seen throughout this
article, there are still blind spots, for instance, in terms of effective application in practice or control of individuals over inferences made about them,
meaning that individuals cannot fully control the processing of their data
by RS, nor the impact RS have on them. Additional consideration of impact
assessments, audits, greater transparency, freedom of choice, and even new
rights may be necessary to effectively close this gap. Finally, transparency,
through its role in empowering user choice, understanding, and accountability of RS creators and deployers, also has a vital role to play. Yet, it has to be
regulated in a complex landscape of overlapping and conflicting interests and
obligations that include IP law, data protection law, and features of complex
AI technologies. Nevertheless, a push towards transparency is visible in the
recent legislative initiatives in the EU. To help regulators think through this
complex field going forward, we emphasise the need for purpose-driven regulation and build a taxonomy of the diversity of information, recipients, and
forms of disclosure that regulators can consider when shaping their policy.
The regulatory options we have highlighted should not prejudice other
complementary and vital efforts. One such effort is investing in digital literacy and education to enhance people’s awareness and knowledge about
artificial intelligence, 243 especially regarding the harms, benefits and effects
of the most common applications that track, target and categorize individuals
242
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(RS, for instance). It is vital to reduce information asymmetries, empower
users and make them more prepared to deal with these technologies, ensuring their rights and informational self-determination. Another example
is interdisciplinary training of data scientists that could improve the value-driven design of technology in practice. Currently, discrepancies between
formal legal requirements and the real practice can reduce the GDPR to
a formality. 244 It requires a more granular application of its rules, 245 in a
“user-centric design”. 246 Careful in-depth consideration throughout the process of technology design and implementation is necessary in order to ensure
desirable social outcomes are achieved and relevant legal standards or goals
are met. In order to safeguard individual autonomy from the continuous
shaping and moulding exerted by RS online, regulators and policy-makers
need to think holistically about the different dimensions of regulation, as
well as the entirety of the RS— from their creation and design, through their
deployment, until their final use and interaction with human beings.
Whether it is a law-by-design approach that seeks to shape RS design, a
rights-based approach to empower users to control how they are perceived
and profiled by RS, or a focus on processes and procedures to correct asymmetries in information and power between creators and users of RS through
transparency measures, there are a range of tools available to policy makers.
Like any regulation, turning these ideas into a regulatory framework would
require balancing competing interests. Despite the potential challenges, there
needs to be a clear stance about the priority of individual autonomy as a
value that is worth pursuing and protecting. Autonomy and self-determination, both individual and collective, underpin fundamental values in our
social and legal orders, including the rule of law, democracy, and human
rights. As the digital increasingly shapes large parts of our lives, the protection of autonomy needs to be expanded and cover operation of innovations
exerting ‘soft power’ over us like RS. Using the goal of individual autonomy
as a North Star to aim for, policy-makers could shape a purposeful regulatory space that ensures truly human-centred technology. This is a young
and dynamic field of research, however, and more is undoubtedly to come.
New policy developments, such as the drafts of the Digital Services Act, the
AI Act, and the e-Privacy Regulation, clearly highlight that there is political
will to act and shape technology instead of simply allowing it to shape us.
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To make these attempts meaningful, it is important to focus on autonomy
through different means.

